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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lawrence James Crow pied guilty to one count of 
attempted murder. He received a unified sentence of fifteen years, with nine years 
fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Crow contends the district court erred in imposing a civil penalty 
in the amount of $5,000, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307. Mr. Crow also contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of Mr. Crow's 
mental health issues and other mitigating factors as well as the additional information 
submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On the morning of July 22, 2010, law enforcement officials responded to a report 
regarding a shooting. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl), 1 p.2.) The 
victim of the shooting, Jessica Martinez,2 had a gunshot wound to her left forearm. 
(PSI, p.3.) The bullet had split into two pieces-one lodged near Ms. Martinez's left 
pinky finger and one near her elbow. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Martinez was released from the 
hospital with an appointment to see a surgeon at a later time. (PSI, p.38.) 
Law enforcement learned from Ms. Martinez that she had a son with Lawrence 
Crow and they had been in a dating relationship for six years but had recently broken 
up. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Martinez had gone to Mr. Crow's mother's house on the day of the 
1 The PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
containing the PSI, mental health evaluation, and attachments. These documents will 
hereinafter be described as the "PSI" for ease of reference. 
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incident to pick up her son. (PSI, p.3.) Shortly after arriving at Mr. Crow's mother's 
house, she and Mr. Crow quarreled, in part, because he was intoxicated. (PSI, p.3.) 
During their argument, Mr. Crow pulled a gun out of his front pants pocket. (PSI, p.3.) 
He pointed the gun at her and allegedly said, "[i]f I can't have you nobody will" and "I got 
this for you." (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Martinez ran into the house and he followed her. (PSI, 
p.3.) Ms. Martinez pushed the gun away, and it discharged, shooting her in the finger 
and forearm. (PSI, pp.3, 17.) Ms. Martinez then went into the bathroom. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Crow accidentally discharged another shot into the floor outside the bathroom door 
while he was outside the door. (PSI, p.3; Supp.R., pp.25-26;3) Then Mr. Crow entered 
the bathroom, sank to the floor, and began hugging Ms. Martinez and handed her the 
gun. (PSI, p.3; 3/14/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.14-24.) 
Mr. Crow was charged by amended information with one count of attempted first 
degree murder with the sentencing enhancement of use of a firearm in the commission 
of a crime and infliction of great bodily injury.4 (R., pp.156-157.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Crow pied guilty to the attempted murder 
charge5 and the enhancements were dismissed. (3/14/12 Tr., p.4, L.s.7-21, p.16, L.20 
- p.17, L.4; R., pp.274-284.) The district court ordered a PSI, and mental health6 and 
2 After the incident, Ms. Martinez married and was thereafter known as Jessica Matsaw. 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.1-2; PSI, p.5.) For purposes of consistency, appellant will refer to 
Jessica Matsaw as "Ms. Martinez." 
3 Throughout this brief, the Clerk's Record shall be designated as "R.", and the 
Supplemental Clerk's Record shall be designated as "Supp.R." 
4 Although Mr. Crow was initially also charged with one count of felony domestic battery 
involving traumatic injury in the presence of children in addition to the attempted 
murder, several months thereafter, the prosecutor filed an amended information omitting 
that charge. (R., pp.81-82, 156-157; 4/4/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-24.) 
5See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). (3/14/12 Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.4.) 
6 Prior to Mr. Crow's plea of guilty, a psychological evaluation had been ordered at the 
request of defense counsel. (R., pp.161, 165-167, 169-170.) 
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substance abuse evaluations prior to sentencing. (3/14/12 Tr., p.25, L.4 - p.26, L.9; R., 
pp.88-89, 285.) 
The district court imposed upon Mr. Crow a sentence of fifteen years, with nine 
years fixed, and a civil penalty of $5,000 under I.C. § 19-5307 as a separate civil 
judgment.7 (5/8/12 Tr., p.98, Ls.6-9; R., pp.299, 301-306.) Mr. Crow filed a timely 
I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence (hereinafter, Rule 35). (R., p.308.) At the 
hearing on his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Crow elicited testimony and provided new 
information for the district court to consider in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion for 
leniency; however, the district court denied Mr. Crow's motion. (11/2/12 Tr., generally 
Supp. R., pp.22-33, 39.) Mr. Crow filed a timely appeal from the Judgment of 
Conviction. (R., pp.310-312; Supp. R., pp.41-43.) 
7 The Civil Judgment was officially recorded in Bingham County. (R., p.306.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in ordering a civil judgment under I.C. § 19-5307 based 
on a conviction for attempted murder? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Crow's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the new 




The District Court Erred When It Ordered Mr. Crow To Pay $5,000 Pursuant To Idaho 
Code § 19-5307 
A. Introduction 
Pursuant to his guilty plea to attempted murder, the district court ordered 
Mr. Crow to pay $5,000 to the victim under Idaho Code § 19-5307. However, I.C. § 19-
5307 only permits the district court to order a civil penalty of $5,000 when the defendant 
has been found guilty of any felony listed in I.C. § 19-5307(2). Because attempted 
murder in not included in the list of felonies set forth in I.C. § 19-5307, the district court 
erred. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Ordered Mr. Crow To Pay $5,000 To The Victim 
Pursuant To Idaho Code§ 19-5307 
Mr. Crow pied guilty to attempted murder. The district court ordered that 
Mr. Crow pay a fine of $5,000 to the victim. (5/8/12 Tr., p.77, Ls.1-5.) However, in 
doing so, the district court exceeded its authority under I.C. § 19-5307. Idaho 
Code § 19-5307 provides the district court with the option to order the defendant in a 
criminal case pay an additional fine when convicted of any of the crimes enumerated in 
I.C. § 19-5307(2). The fine is payable to the victim and functions as a civil judgment. 
However, in this case, the district court erred because the statute only allows a 
judgment against the defendant for the list of crimes set forth in section two, and the 
legislature included no language whereby an "attempt" or even a "conspiracy to commit" 
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would fall under those crimes listed in I. C. § 19-5307(2). 8 Thus, an attempted murder 
does not fall within the list of crimes for which the district court may award a civil 
judgment under I.C. § 19-5307. Specifically, the statute reads: 
19-5307. FINES IN CASES OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE. 
(1) Irrespective of any penalties set forth under state law, and in addition 
thereto, the court, at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed 
necessary by the court, may impose a fine not to exceed five thousand 
dollars ($5,000) against any defendant found guilty of any felony listed in 
subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) The felonies for which a fine created under this section may be 
imposed are those described in: 
Section 18-4001, Idaho Code (Murder) ... 
I.C. § 19-5307. Mr. Crow asserts that under the plain language of this statute, the 
district court erred when it ordered Mr. Crow to pay $5,000 to the victim of an attempted 
murder. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996). 
Further, if this Court were to find that the statute is ambiguous, this Court must 
find in Mr. Crow's favor under the rule of lenity, which requires that criminal statutes 
must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Where the statute is not ambiguous, 
the appellate court is to give effect to the plain meanings of the terms in the statute. 
8 The Idaho Legislature, had it intended to include all attempts, solicitations, and 
conspiracies to commit the listed crimes, knew how to broaden the application of this 
code section. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-7905(1)(f) (the felony stalking statute, which contains 
the language, "[t]he defendant has previously been convicted· of a crime, or an attempt, 
solicitation or conspiracy to commit a crime"). 
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Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). However, 
should this Court find that the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that 
ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Crow's favor. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 
99, 103 (2008). "It is well-settled that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly and in 
favor of the defendant." McCoy, 128 Idaho at 365 . Accordingly, Mr. Crow asserts that 
if it is not clear whether or not the legislature intended to include attempts, solicitations, 
or conspiracies to commit the crimes listed in I.C. § 19-5307(2), this Court should read 
this statute in favor of Mr. Crow and vacate the order. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Crow's Rule 35 Motion For 
A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Information Presented At The Rule 35 
Hearing 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). 'The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
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(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Crow does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Crow must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
Further, "[i]f the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant 
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented 
with the motion for reduction. Trent, 125 Idaho at 253. 
Mr. Crow first asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the 
mitigating factors that exist in his case, such as his young age, his previously 
undiagnosed mental health condition and his incredible family support. 
Mr. Crow was only twenty-two years old when he committed the instant offenses. 
(PSI, p.2.) In addition to his young age, Mr. Crow does not have any prior felony 
convictions. (PSI, pp.7-8.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be 
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 
Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State 
v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
The defendant in Hoskins pied guilty to two counts of drawing a check without 
funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pied guilty to the charge of 
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and 
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Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the defendants had no 
prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. The 
Hoskins court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the 
absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. Here, Mr. Crow had several 
misdemeanor convictions, but had never been charged with a felony. (PSI, pp.7-8.) 
Another fact that should have received the attention of the district court is that 
Mr. Crow has strong support from family members and friends. See State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of 
his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
The letters and testimony from his friends and family reveal a pleasant, outgoing 
young man, who worked hard in school, and even completed some college.9 (PSI, 
pp.12, 22; 5/8/12 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.63, L.5.) It is telling that Mr. Crow's family and 
friends went to many of his hearings to show their support for Mr. Crow and their 
commitment to helping him. (11/2/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-23.) Further, many family 
members were present and ready to testify on behalf of Mr. Crow at his sentencing 
hearing. (5/8/12 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.40, L.13.) Prior to his incarceration, Mr. Crow was 
very close to his two young sons and he spent quite a lot of time with them. (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Crow's culture and family are very important to him. (PSI, pp.16, 24.) He is a 
member of the Shoshone Bannock Native American tribe and took his two young sons 
to tribal pow-wows. (PSI, p.24.) At sentencing, the distdct court noted that family 
9 Even Mr. Crow's mental health evaluator noted that he, "is a hard worker, dependable, 
intelligent, goal-directed, and is an extrovert." (PSI, p.22.) The evaluator went on to say 
that Mr. Crow has good support from his family but needs psychiatric services to 
address his mental illness and substance abuse issues. (PSI., p.22.) 
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support was very important, particularly in light of rehabilitative potential. (5/8/12 Tr., 
p.87, Ls.21-23.) 
Idaho recognizes that good employment history should be considered a 
mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Mr. Crow has always been a hard worker, and 
had a job waiting for him upon his release. (12/7/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.4-6; PSI, pp.12-13, 
23.) 
Mr. Crow was diagnosed with a mental health condition in his court-ordered 
mental health evaluation-bi-polar disorder. (5/8/12 Tr., p.91, L.2; PSI, pp.13, 26.) 
However, Mr. Crow was just diagnosed with this condition, and has never taken 
medication to control the condition. (PSI, pp.20-21, 25.) The presentence investigator 
noted that the medication may reduce Mr. Crow's problematic behaviors that escalated 
into this incident. (PSI, p.15.) Further, Mr. Crow had never received mental health 
counseling for his condition, and the mental health evaluator recommended that 
Mr. Crow "could benefit from mood stabilizing medications and counseling services to 
address his mental health symptoms." (PSI, pp.13-14.) The mental health evaluator 
noted that, should Mr. Crow receive proper treatment for his Bipolar II Disorder, it may 
decrease his impulsivity, irritability, depression and hypomania. (PSI, pp.14, 30.) This 
would enable Mr. Crow to exercise better judgment and make better choices. (PSI, 
p.30.) Further, the facts of this case and subsequent evaluations show that Mr. Crow 
was experiencing the symptoms of his afflictions, including irritability, impulsivity, and 
depression, at the time he committed the crime. 10 (PSI, pp.21, 48-54.) Mr. Crow's 
10 Notably, Mr. Crow consistently maintained that he had originally purchased the gun 
used in the incident several days prior because he was despondent about the status of 
the relationship and was considering committing suicide. (PSI, pp.17, 48-49, 54-55; 
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mental health condition had not yet been diagnosed at the time of the incident and it 
appears that he may have been self-medicating, using alcohol. (PSI, p.30.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to 
consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 
573, 581 (1999). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem." 
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). The majority of 
Mr. Crow's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, pp.7-9.) 
Mr. Crow had been drinking heavily on the day of the incident, consuming a pint of rum 
prior to Ms. Martinez's arrival at his mother's house. (PSI, pp.17, 29) However, 
Mr. Crow wants to stop drinking, and his goal is to live a s·ubstance-free life. 11 (PSI, 
p.15.) He is willing to participate in substance abuse treatment services. (PSI, p.22.) 
Supp.R., pp.24-25, 31-33; 11/2/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.2-6.) Mr. Crow said that he never 
intended to hurt Ms. Martinez that day. (PSI, p.17; Supp.R., pp.31-33.) 
11 Although the district court ordered a substance abuse evaluation prior to sentencing, 
the evaluator noted that a GAIN Short Screener did not indicate the presence of a 
substance abuse disorder in the past 12 months, and because Mr. Crow had been in 
custody for the last 640 days, a substance abuse disorder could not be determined. 
"Per Idaho Department of Correction policy and procedure, Mr. Crow was not required 
to complete the GAIN-I Assessment." (PSI, pp.15, 17, 32-33.) 
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Additionally, Mr. Crow has expressed his remorse for committing the instant 
offense. Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses 
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v. 
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts' 
expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to 
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. 
See also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time 
offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his 
rehabilitation efforts); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(reducing sentence of first time offender who accepted. responsibility, expressed 
remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at issue), rev'd on other 
grounds, State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990). 
Mr. Crow was remorseful immediately after the incident; even at the scene he 
was observed hugging Ms. Martinez and telling her that he was sorry. (PSI, p.51.) 
Mr. Crow, during his allocution, read verbatim a statement that he had spent a great 
deal of time preparing. (5/8/12 Tr., p.84, Ls.23-25.) In the statement, Mr. Crow, to the 
best of his abilities, apologized for his conduct, "I could say sorry to you an infinite 
amount of times," and expressed his remorse, "[i]f I [could] go back in time and change 
the past, I would." (5/8/12 Tr., p.85, Ls.10-11, p.86, Ls.5-6.) Mr. Crow also accepted 
responsibility for his actions. He was always forthright and honest in his contacts with 
law enforcement and took responsibility for his actions when interviewed by the court-
appointed investigator. (PSI, pp.48-54; Supp.R.,pp.22-27.) Further, Mr. Crow is not a 
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danger to the general public as noted in his psychological evaluation. (Exhibit B 
attached to Supplemental Record, p.6.) 
Second, Mr. Crow asserts that had the district court properly considered his 
rehabilitative potential, family support, and mental health issues, it would have reduced 
his sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. He further asserts that his sentence 
should have been reduced in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with 
his Rule 35 motion. Mr. Crow asserts that the district court's denial of his motion for a 
sentence modification represents an abuse of discretion. 
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Crow submitted information 
regarding his time in custody. Since his sentencing, Mr. Crow has used his time in 
custody to better himself. He has completed a six hour long parenting class. 
(Supplemental Confidential Exhibits, p.2.) Mr. Crow also submitted several affidavits, 
including an affidavit from the court-appointed investigator and an affidavit by Mr. Crow 
himself. (Supp.R., pp.22-27, 31-33.) The affidavit of the investigator, Brian Emfield, 
verified that Mr. Crow was always honest and forthright regarding his version of events, 
he took responsibility for his actions, and he did not intend to harm Ms. Martinez that 
day. (Supp.R., pp.22-27.) Mr. Crow also submitted an affidavit from his sister in which 
she told the district court that she had never witnessed Mr. Crow hitting or striking 
Ms. Martinez and that she believed Mr. Crow was a good, caring family man. (Supp.R., 
pp.29-30.) The affidavit from Rebecca LaVatta, the mother of Mr. Crow's youngest son, 
Jaydon, implored the court to release Mr. Crow, as her son needed his father-a 
sentiment echoed by Mr. Crow in his affidavit. (Supp.R., pp.28, 31-33.) 
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Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to reduce Mr. Crow's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crow respectfully requests that this Court vacate the fine imposed under I.C. 
§ 19-5307. Mr. Crow further requests that this Court reduce his sentence to ten years 
unified, with three years fixed, or as it otherwise deems appropriate. Alternatively, he 
requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and the 
case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
SALL~ . OOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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